Northern Illinois University Law Review
Volume 24

Issue 3

Article 1

7-1-2004

Arctic National Wildlife Refuge Oil: Canadian and Gwich'in Indian
Legal Responses to 1002 Area Development
Michael T. Delcomyn

Follow this and additional works at: https://huskiecommons.lib.niu.edu/niulr
Part of the Law Commons

Suggested Citation
Michael T. Delcomyn, Comment, Arctic National Wildlife Refuge Oil: Canadian and Gwich'in Indian Legal
Responses to 1002 Area Development, 24 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 789 (2004).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Huskie Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Northern Illinois University Law Review by an authorized editor of Huskie Commons. For
more information, please contact jschumacher@niu.edu.

Arctic National Wildlife Refuge Oil:
Canadian and Gwich'in Indian Legal
Responses to 1002 Area Development
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRO D UCTION ..........................................................................
BACKGROUND ON THE
A.

ANWR

AND THE PARTIES INVOLVED .....

790
792

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ARCTIC NATIONAL WILDLIFE

REFU G E ...............................................................
792

II.

1002 AREA ..................... 794

B.

WILDLIFE OF THE ANWR AND THE

C.

INTERESTS IN OIL DEVELOPMENT IN THE

1.
2.

1002 AREA .......... 796
Proponentsof Development............................................. 796
Opponents of Development......................................... 800

CANADIAN AND GWICH'IN LEGAL RESPONSES TO OIL

D EVELO PMENT ........................................................................... 803
A.

CANADIAN RESPONSES .........................................................

804

B.
GW ICH'IN RESPONSES ......................................................... 810
C O N CLU SION .............................................................................. 8 16

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 24 '

INTRODUCTION

Strangely enough, one of the fiercest environmental and political
battles of the past twenty-plus years' is being waged over land where the
sun, literally, does not shine for many months a year.2 This land is a
section of the north shore of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge
[hereinafter ANWR] in Alaska, commonly referred to as the 1002 area,
which is currently closed to oil drilling but subject to opening per an act of
Congress.3 Depending on who is asked, this land has either a tremendous
potential for oil or, conversely, merely a small and problematic chance for
oil production. An unusual alliance is pushing for development of the 1002
area. The state of Alaska, 4 oil companies such as British Petroleum, 5 the
Teamsters union,6 some native Alaskan Indians, 7 and the Bush
administration 8 are in support of oil development in the 1002 area. On the
other side of the debate are the standard environmental groups, 9 the
Canadian government,'° and a different group of native Alaskan Indians,
all of whom would like the 1002 area declared off-limits to oil exploration
forever.

1.
Samantha K. Sherman, Information is Alaska's Greatest Untapped Resource, 8
ENVTL. LAW. 215 (2001).
2.
Bonnie Docherty, Challenging Boundaries: The Arctic National Wildlife
Refuge and International Environmental Law Protection, 10 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 70, 70
(2001).
3.
Id. at 77.
4.
Robert W. Corbisier, The Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, Correlative Rights,
and Sourdough: Not Just for Bread Anymore, 19 ALASKA L. REV. 393, 405 (2002).
5.
Samuel Stanke, Like Wilderness, but Need Oil? Securing America's Future
Energy Act Puts Little Between Accident-Prone Oil Companies and the Arctic National
Wildlife Refuge, 32 ENvTL. L. 905, 937 (2002).
6.
E.M. Swift, Pipeline Dreams; The Last True American Wilderness is Up for
Grabs, and the Stakes are Higher Than Eitherthe Environmentalistsor the Oil Interests are
Telling You, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 13, 2002, at 70.
7.
Kristofer Pasquale, ANWR: The Legislative Quagmire Surrounding Stakeholder
Control and Protection, and the Practical Consequencesof Allowing Exploration,9 BUFF.
ENVTL. L.J. 245, 253 (2002).
8.
Stanke, supra note 5, at 927.
9.
Weigert, Arctic National Wildlife Refuge: In the Debate Over Drilling in the
Refuge's Coastal Plain, the Environment is the Only True Loser, 8 ENVTL. LAW. 169, 169
(2001).
10.
Alan Nymark, Energy, The Environment and Natural Resources in the
Canada/U.S. Context; Canada-U.S. Environmental Cooperation, 28 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 27, 35
(2002).
11.
Swift, supra note 6, at 77.
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Rarely has a predominantly environmental issue stirred so much
public and political interest. The strong interest is in part due to the fact
that oil development in the ANWR has been debated since before Ronald
Reagan was president of the United States.' 2 Additionally, both the
proponents and opponents to drilling are making every effort in order to
prevail. Drilling proponents tie oil development in the 1002 area to
terrorism and the incidents of September 1lth13 and the record electrical
blackout that affected much of the Midwest and Northeast United States
and Canada in 2003.14 Opponents to drilling have countered by pointing to
potential environmental damage 5 and potential harm to wildlife in the
area. 16 Opponents even allege
that drilling in the 1002 area threatens an
7
entire culture's way of life.'
There have been a number of scholarly and opinion-editorial articles
arguing for or against drilling. This comment, however, will focus not on
arguing for one side of the issue. Instead, it will consider some of the
likely legal ramifications to result if Congress passes a bill allowing oil
production in the ANWR, and the impact that these potential lawsuits could
and should have on the decision whether or not to drill. Part I of this
comment is divided into three parts. Part I-A outlines the legislative
history of the ANWR, and how the issue currently stands. Part I-B
describes some of the many animals that call the refuge generally, and the
1002 area specifically, home. Part I-C discusses the interests various
groups have in oil development, and is divided into two parts. Part I-C-I
discusses some of the parties supporting oil development, while part I-C-2
discusses some of the parties opposed to development, and their interests.
This discussion of interests will serve as background for the analysis of the
legal claims some of the opponents to drilling could bring. The discussion
will also demonstrate what is at stake in this issue. The Gwich'in Indians
(a group of Native Alaskans) will be discussed specifically, including some
of their history, as well as their current status.

12.
See Sherman, supra note 1, at 215.
13.
Stanke, supra note 5, at 911.
14.
See William Neikirk, U.S. to Probe Gas Prices; Critics: Oil Firms Used
Blackout as Excuse for Increase, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 4, 2003, at 11.
15.
See Richard J. Ansson, Jr., The North American Agreement on Environmental
Protection and the Arctic Council Agreement: Will These Multinational Agreements
Adequately Protect the Environment?, 29 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 101 (1998).
16.
Weigert, supra note 9, at 179.
17.
Anthony Lathrop, People of the Caribou in the Land of the Oil: Climate
Change, the Venetie Decision, and Oil Development in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge,
8 Wis. ENvTL. L.J. 169, 182 (2002).
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Part II of this paper is divided into two subsections. Part 1-A deals
with Canadian legal responses to American oil development in the 1002
area and, more specifically, legal responses to the results from the
development. One possibility is a suit against the oil developers and the
United States for any actual environmental damages that occur in Canada
as a result of the drilling.' 8 Canada's second potential suit would be against
the United States government for damages stemming from America's
violation of an existing bilateral agreement by permitting/authorizing
drilling.' 9 Part 1-B explores the Gwich'in Indian challenges that could
arise. First, the Gwich'in could potentially sue in tort against the oil
companies for any environmental damages that resulted from the drilling.2 °
Second, they could also sue the oil companies for environmental
damages,
2
if the Gwich'in are recognized as a sovereign nation. '
Part III argues that the total potential costs, in more than just dollars,
from these lawsuits by Canada and the Gwich'in should be considered by
the United States government as well as oil developers when deciding
whether to open and drill in the 1002 area.
I.

A.

BACKGROUND ON THE

ANWR AND THE PARTIES INVOLVED

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ARCTIC NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE

The Franklin Roosevelt Administration reserved approximately
67,440,000 acres of land in northeast Alaska during World War 1l.22 The
Administration set this land aside because it believed that the land
contained oil that may have been needed to aid in the war effort.2 3 Nothing
was developed, however. In 1960, President Eisenhower created the Arctic
National Wildlife Range through Public Land Order 2214, with a stated
goal of "preserving unique wildlife, wilderness and recreational values"

18.

Docherty, supra note 2, at 111.

20.

See generally David A. Westbrook, Liberal Environmental Jurisprudence, 27

19.

Id. at 85.

U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 619 (1994) (discussing environmental tort suits).
21.
See Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 522 U.S. 520 (1998)
(discussing the sovereignty issue).
22.
Public Land Order 82, 8 Fed. Reg. 1599 (1942).
23.
Pasquale, supra note 7, at 247.
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therein.
Out of the original 67,440,000 acres a total of 8,900,000 acres
were reserved under this Order.2 5
This area remained untouched until 1980, when President Carter
signed the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act [hereinafter
ANILCA].26 ANILCA added "an addition of approximately nine million
one hundred and sixty thousand acres of public lands" to the existing
8,900,000 acres from Public Land Order 2214, and changed its name to
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. 27 ANILCA was, in general, designed to
preserve and protect this "nationally significant" land.28 Specifically,
ANILCA stated among its goals the conservation of the Porcupine Caribou
herd, 29 and the desire "to fulfill the international treaty obligations of the
United States with respect to fish and wildlife and their habitats."3 °
Perhaps even more significantly, ANILCA attempted to "provide ...the
opportunity for continued subsistence uses by local residents.'
ANILCA also designated much of the reserved land as wilderness
consistent with the Wilderness Act.32 The Wilderness Act allows Congress
to designate land as "wilderness," thus giving the land strong protection
from human development by preserving it in its natural state.3 3
Commentators have asserted that one of the main goals of the Wilderness
Act is to save the land "for the enjoyment of future generations." 34 The
Wilderness Act defines "wilderness" as an area untouched by man that
keeps "its primeval character and influence, without permanent
improvements or human habitation. 35
The wilderness designation
prohibits any "commercial enterprise" or "permanent road within any
wilderness area., 36 This naturally raises the question as to how there can

24.
Public Land Order 2214, 25 Fed. Reg. 12,598 (1960).
25.
Id.
26.
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act [hereinafter ANILCA], Pub.
L. No. 96-487, § 303, 94 Stat. 2371 (1980) (current version at 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3233

(2000)).

27.
ANILCA § 303(2), 94 Stat. at 2390.
28.
ANILCA § 10 1(a), 94 Stat. at 2374.
29.
ANILCA § 303(2)(B)(i), 94 Stat. at 2390.
30.
ANILCA § 303(2)(B)(ii), 94 Stat. at 2390.
31.
ANILCA § 303(2)(B)(iii), 94 Stat. at 2390.
32.
ANILCA § 702(3), 94 Stat. at 2418.
33.
Wilderness Act, Pub. L. No. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890, §§ 890-891 (1964) (current
version at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (2003)) [hereinafter Wilderness Act].
34.
Brandon Dalling, Administrative Wilderness: Protecting our National
Forestlands in Contravention of Congressional Intent and Public Policy, 42 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 385, 401-02 (2002).
35.
Wilderness Act, supra note 33.
36.
Id. at 891.
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be any potential for oil exploration in an area specifically cut off from just
such an endeavor? The answer is the controversial section 1002 of
ANILCA.
Even though ANILCA created millions of acres of wilderness, section
1002 of the Act left open the potential for oil development on
approximately 1,500,000 acres of the northern coastal plain.37 This area is
now referred to simply as the 1002 area.38 Although actual oil and gas
development were still off limits in this section of the coastal plain,
Congress retained the authority to allow development, per its approval.39
ANILCA called for a study of the coastal plain area and its wildlife, the
effects of natural resource development on the wildlife and native people in
the area, and the publication of an Environmental Impact Statement prior to
opening the area. 40 Congress knew of the potential for a large oil field in
the 1002 area, so it did not want to designate the entire coastal plain as
wilderness and thus preclude all future development. 4' However, Congress
was also concerned with possible negative environmental impacts
associated with oil exploration and development, so it did not want to allow
for immediate development, either.42 Hence the compromise of keeping
the area open, but only allowing development by an act of Congress once it
knew (via the Environmental Impact Statement and other studies) that the
environment would not be adversely affected in any significant manner.
This is where the land and the debate stand today. Since ANILCA
was signed, there have been numerous attempts to pass legislation opening
the 1002 area for development, but to date none have succeeded. 43 Part of
the reason for this lack of success is the great number and diversity of
wildlife species that call the northern coastal plain generally, and the 1002
area specifically, home.
B.

WILDLIFE OF THE ANWR AND THE

1002 AREA

According to the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, the
"[riefuge contains the greatest wildlife diversity of any protected area in the
circumpolar north. 44 There are almost 180 species of birds (some

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

ANILCA § 1002, 94 Stat. at 2449.
See Docherty, supra note 2.
ANILCA § 1003, 94 Stat. at 2452.
ANILCA § 1002, 94 Stat. at 2449.
Sherman, supra note 1,at 215.
Id.
Docherty, supra note 2, at 78.

U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, Descriptionof the Refuge: Refuge Brochure Text,
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migratory birds), 36 species of fish, and 45 species of mammals including
musk oxen, polar bears, foxes and the Porcupine Caribou herd, just to name
a few.45 Of these, the Porcupine Caribou are arguably the most important
animals in the ANWR regarding the oil debate.
The Porcupine Caribou are a unique herd of animals that annually
migrate "more than 800 miles" between Canada and the United States.46
This is the longest mammal migration in the world,47 and one that tourists
travel to Alaska specifically to view.48 The herd's destination is the very
area that is at issue here-the coastal plain and the 1002 area. 49 The
Porcupine Caribou use the coastal plain and the 1002 area as their calving
Scientists
ground, 50 and have been doing so for "thousands of years.'
believe this migration is done for a number of reasons. First, the caribou
enjoy relative safety on the coastal plain during calving because there are
not as many of the herd's natural predators on the plain as elsewhere in the
Refuge. 52 This includes important relief from mosquitoes, which farther
inland are so numerous that they can drain up to a quart of blood per week
from each caribou.53 Avoiding predators and mosquitoes increases the
chances for first week survival of the calves, after which the young caribou
are stronger and faster and therefore better able to survive in less protected
areas. 54 Second, the coastal plain and the 1002 area contain the best and
55
most nutritious food for the mothers and, in turn, their still nursing calves.
The Porcupine Caribou are generally not as successful as other caribou at
reproduction, but their "calf survival rate rises when they are able to give
,,56thnwnessuho
The herd then winters south of
birth on the traditional calving ground.
the coastal plain, where the Gwich'in Indians rely on the herd for almost
their entire subsistence-based livelihood.57
available at http://alaska.fws.gov/nwrO/arctic/descrip.html (last modified Aug. 30, 2002).
45.
Id.
46.
Id.
47.
Docherty, supra note 2, at 73.
48.
U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, Porcupine Caribou Herd, at http://alaska.
fws.gov/nwrOlarcticlcaribou.html#sectionI (last modified Aug. 30, 2002).
49.
Id.
50.
Id.
5I.
Stanke, supra note 5, at 915 n.91.
52.
U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, Porcupine Caribou Herd, at http://www.
r7.fws.gov/nwr/arctic/caribou.html (last modified Aug. 30, 2002). Fewer wolves, bears and
golden eagles that normally prey on the caribou live on the coastal plain. Id.
53.
Docherty, supra note 2, at 88.
54.
U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, Porcupine Caribou Herd, at http://alaska.
fws.gov/nwrO/arctic/caribou.html#section I (last modified Aug. 30, 2002).
55.
Id.
56.
Stanke, supra note 5, at 915.
57.
Id.
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Many of the animals that call the ANWR and, more importantly, the
coastal plain home, currently enjoy some protection under United States
treaties. For example, the United States, Norway, Denmark, Canada and
the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics signed a treaty to protect
the habitat of the polar bear.58 "The United States is [also] party to four
bilateral migratory bird treaties which protect more than a hundred species
that nest in the Arctic Refuge. 59 Perhaps most importantly of all, the
United States and Canada have an agreement regarding the Porcupine
Caribou herd. 60 This agreement recognizes the Porcupine Caribou herd as
a valuable natural resource relied upon by various groups for many needs. 6'
It states as its objectives the conservation of "the Porcupine Caribou Herd
and its habitat through international co-operation" and ensuring that
"opportunities for customary and traditional uses of the Porcupine Caribou
herd" continue, which includes subsistence use by natives.6 2
C.

INTERESTS IN OIL DEVELOPMENT IN THE

1.

Proponentsof Development

1002 AREA

The vigor of the debate over oil development in the 1002 area can be
traced in part to the many groups that have a pecuniary interest in
development. For example, the State of Alaska itself is a strong proponent
for oil development.6 3 This might seem a little counterintuitive, as one
normally considers a state's interests as lying in preserving its parks and
other areas of wilderness. However, the state of Alaska is heavily
dependent on tax revenue from its oil fields. In fact, some have argued that
Alaska has been relying more and more on oil revenue. 64 Alaska receives
most of its revenue directly from the current oil drilling in the state. Oil
money "will account for close to [eighty percent] of the 2002-2003 fiscal
year unrestricted general-purpose revenue. 6 5 Consequently, the state's
budget goes as the oil money goes: if oil money drops off (from declining

58.
59.
60.
U.S.-Can.,
61.
62.
63.
64.
69

Docherty, supra note 2, at 90.
Id.
Agreement on the Conservation of the Porcupine Caribou Herd, July 17, 1987,
T.I.A.S. No. 11259 [hereinafter Agreement].
Id. at2.
Id. at 3.
Corbisier, supra note 4, at 405.
Id. at 404.
Id.
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production, which has begun),6 6 the state will be forced to find alternative
means of income. The dependence the State of Alaska has on oil money is
illustrated by the fact that the residents of Alaska do not pay an income tax
or a sales tax. 7 In fact, the state set up a "Permanent Fund" from oil
revenue that disburses a varying amount to each citizen every year (in 2001
each resident of Alaska received $1,850 from the fund). 68 Due to this
reliance on oil taxes and fees, Alaska has a vested interest in seeing further
oil development. 69
Naturally, oil companies have many financial incentives to develop
the 1002 area. Specifically, British Petroleum [hereinafter BP] has a strong
interest in seeing development in the 1002 area. 70 BP has been called the
"highest profile proponent of opening the ANWR Coastal Plain [the 1002
area] to oil and gas development."'', BP will substantially profit if it is
allowed to develop the 1002 area for oil, considering that estimates put the
total value of oil in the 1002 area near $80 billion.7 2 Commentators assert
that BP will probably be an early bidder for a lease to develop in the 1002
area. 73 This is in part because BP already has a strong foothold in the
region.74
Similarly, the Teamsters Union supports oil development for the
number of American jobs that it would create. 75 The Teamsters has been
persistently lobbying Congress in support of opening the 1002 area for oil
development. 76 The Teamsters estimates that approximately one-half
million American jobs would be created if the 1002 area were opened for
development. 77 The Teamsters would get 25,000 of those jobs. 78 The
Teamsters Union, like the State of Alaska, stands to gain substantial
financial benefits from the jobs that the new oil fields would create.
However, it is not just the proverbial "big business" that wants the
1002 area opened for oil development. Another group that has a strong

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Swift, supra note 6, at 76.

Id.

Pasquale, supra note 7, at 264.
Stanke, supra note 5, at 937.
Id.
Swift, supra note 6, at 76.
Stanke, supra note 5, at 937.
Id. BP "produces about 43 percent of the oil in Prudhoe Bay." Id.
Swift, supra note 6, at 73.
See Sara N. Pasquinelli, Comment, To Drill or Not to Drill: The Arctic National

Wildlife Refuge v. The "Need"for U.S. Energy Independence, 33 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.

503 (2003).
77.
78.

Id. at 514.
Id.
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interest in seeing development is the Inupiat Indians, 79 a group of Native
Alaskans who live on Kaktovik, a small island just north of the 1002 area.80
The Inupiat stand at the opposite side of the debate from other native
Alaskans because the Inupiat potentially stand to gain financially from any
oil development that occurs in the 1002 area.8'
When oil was discovered in Prudhoe Bay (just east of the 1002 area),
various oil companies began to lobby Congress to clear up all titles to that
land (so there would be no impediment to continued production), and as a
result the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act [ANCSA] was passed in
1971.82 This act "extinguished native aboriginal rights to land in Alaska in
exchange for a cash settlement of $963 million and fee title to 44 million
acres of land," 83 effectively barring any native claims to the subsurface
rights to any oil rich land. ANCSA "created a system of about 200 village
corporations, each of which held surface rights to its land, allocated under
the Act." 84 The Inupiat were one of the groups who took part in this
settlement, and they have reaped the financial benefits ever since. The
settlement, managed by the Alaska Native Fund, supports community
projects and annual $600 payments to members of each tribe.85
In addition, many of the Inupiat are employed at various oil fields and
rigs in the area, especially those at Prudhoe Bay.86 The Inupiat are aware,
however, that those supplies of oil are not infinite, so they are interested in
securing employment for the future as well.87 Hence they support
development of the 1002 area so they can work at the future fields.88 The
Inupiat will likely be hired preferentially because they formed the Arctic
Slope Regional Corporation, which does the hiring at most of the oil fields
in the area and would presumably do the same for any 1002 area fields as
well. 89 Additionally, there is a small chance that the Inupiat, through the
North Slope Borough they formed, can tax any oil companies that drill in
the ANWR. 90 Thus, the Inupiat are in favor of development in the 1002

79.
Pasquale, supra note 7, at 253.
80.
Swift, supra note 6, at 78.
81.
Id. at 79.
Pasquale, supra note 7, at 254. See also 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629 (2001).
82.
83.
Anthony R. Chase, Imminent Threat to America's Last Great Wilderness, 70
DENV. U. L. REv. 43, 48 (1992). 43 U.S.C. § 1603 (2001).
Lathrop, supra note 17, at 171.
84.
Pasquale, supra note 7, at 256.
85.
86.
Id.
87.
See Swift, supra note 6, at 78-79.
88.
Pasquale, supra note 7, at 258.
89.
Id. at 259.
90.
Id. at 260.
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area at least in part because it will translate directly into money and/or jobs
for them. Although they have a large stake in the outcome of the 1002
area, the Inupiat are not the most powerful voice advocating for
development of the 1002 area.
The current Bush Administration strongly supports development in the
1002 area. 91 The Administration's energy policy promotes an increase in
domestic production of natural resources.9 2 This position is exemplified
"in the central and most controversial aspect of the plan-drilling for oil in
the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge."93 In fact, a provision to open the
ANWR was included in the original Securing America's Future Energy Act
[SAFE] in 2001.
Although passed by the House of Representatives, the
Senate had promised to stop that very provision.95 However, the terrorist
attacks of September 11th occurred shortly thereafter, stalling this debate.96
The events of September 11th changed the Administration's approach
to the ANWR issue. The Administration began promoting opening the
refuge by tying the issue to the resulting national security concerns from
the attacks.9 7 The argument is that increasing the domestic production of
oil would in turn lower United States dependence on foreign (i.e. Middle
Eastern) oil. 98 The United States would then presumably be able to
distance itself from the Middle East and its associated problems, such as
terrorism. Any drilling provision was still unable to pass, however, and the
issue stalled. As a result, the Bush administration renewed its efforts to
open the 1002 area to drilling by linking the record blackout in the
northeast United States in August of 2003 with development of domestic
natural resources. 99 Nevertheless, as of the writing of this paper no drilling
provision has been passed by the Congress either alone or in conjunction
with any energy policy bill.

91.

92.

Stanke, supra note 5, at 927.
Christopher R. Clements, No Blood for Oil? United States National Security,

Oil and the Arctic Wildlife Refuge, 28 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL. REV., 87, 95-96

(2003).
93.
Id. at 96-7.
94.
Id. at 98.
95.
Id.
96.
Id.
97.
Id. at 100.
98.
Clements, supra note 92, at 106. See also Stanke, supra note 5, at 924.
99.
William Neikirk, U.S. to Probe Gas Prices; Critics: Oil Firms Used Blackout
as Excuse for Increase, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 4, 2003, at 11.
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2.

Opponents of Development

On the other side of the issue are the groups who oppose oil
development in the 1002 area. As one would imagine, environmental
groups are against any drilling or any oil exploration in the 1002 area.
Groups such as Defenders of Wildlife,'0° the Sierra Club,10 1 and the Natural
Resources Defense Council10 2 all oppose opening the 1002 area for drilling.
The Sierra Club, for example, is concerned about potential harm to wildlife
in the area, as well as damage to the environment due to spills, pollutants
and the like. 0 3 Environmental groups are not the only concerned parties,
however.
The Canadian government generally promotes responsible
development of natural resources by the United States.'°4 Nonetheless, the
Deputy Minister of Environment for Canada has stated that the Canadian
government is "strongly" opposed to opening up the 1002 area for oil
development. 10 5 In fact, the Canadian government even lobbied the United
States Congress to reject the recommendation of the Interior Secretary of
the United States, which was to develop the 1002 area for oil.' 0 6 Canada
believes development will harm the Porcupine Caribou herd, and in turn
the approximately 10,000 Natives who live in Canada and subsist on the
Porcupine Caribou. 0 7 Canada feels the most pressure due to its obligations
to its own Native Indian population. 0 8 This is in great part because
Canada's obligations to its Natives are "constitutional in nature, if not
Canada cannot diminish "Native use of lands," which
greater. '' °
"includes the right of subsistence hunting," without the natives first having

of

Wildlife,

Arctic Refuge

Big

Oil,

at

100.

Defenders

102.

Natural Resources Defense Council, Oil and the Arctic National Wildlife

103.

Sierra Club,

Save

the

from

http://www.defenders.org/wildlife/arctic/overview.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2004).
101.
Sierra Club, Wildlands, at http://www.sierraclub.org/wildlands/arctic/index.asp
(last visited Apr. 4, 2004).
Refuge, at http://www.nrdc.org/land/wildemess/arctic.asp (last revised Mar. 25, 2004).
The

Threat of Oil Drilling,

at http://www.sierraclub.org/

wildlands/arctic/oil.asp (last visited Apr. 4, 2004).
104.
Swift, supra note 6, at 76 (quoting Rodney Moore, spokesman for Canada's
Department of Foreign Affairs).
105.
Nymark, supra note 10, at 35.

Todd Grover, Arctic Equity?: The Supreme Court's Resolution of United States
106.
v. Alaska, 28 ENvTL. L. 1169, 1177 (1998).

107.

See Swift, supra note 6, at 74-76.

James Walker, Oil Development in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge and its
108.
Impact on United States International Wildlife Commitments, 4 INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 1, 44-

45 (Fall 1992).
109.

Id.
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"ceded their aboriginal rights to the government."" 0 In other words,
Canada has a very strong duty to protect the subsistence lifestyle of these
natives who rely on the Porcupine Caribou herd, and cannot take any action
to reduce subsistence hunting without a treaty allowing it to do so."' It
should be kept in mind that harm to the Porcupine Caribou herd can in turn
threaten the very livelihood of the native subsistence hunters in Canada.
Canada desires to protect the Porcupine Caribou herd not just to guard
the interests of the Native Indians in Canada, but also because the Canadian
Government views the Porcupine Caribou as a valuable natural resource
that migrates between Canada and the United States. 1 2 Canada, like the
other groups opposed to development, feels the presence of oil fields and
the associated structures and roads could harm the Porcupine Caribou in a
variety of ways. The presence of roads and pipelines across the migration
route could "deflect caribou movements, and reduce their chances for
survival." '" 3 In general, "caribou are most sensitive at calving time, and
studies have shown that caribou are displaced from their traditional calving
grounds when oil development occurs there."'"1 4 Hence, oil development
on the coastal plain could drive the caribou from their traditional calving
grounds, leaving them more susceptible to the predators and the problens
they avoid by calving in the 1002 area.' ' 5 This could result in a reduction
in the total number of caribou, which currently number only approximately
120,000.116 These potential problems appeared
in the Final Legislative
7
Environmental Impact Statement (FLEIS)."
Canada has demonstrated its commitment to protecting the Porcupine
Caribou herd and its habitat in a variety of ways. The Canadian
Government, for example, entered into the bilateral Agreement on the
Conservation of the Porcupine Caribou Herd with the United States." 18 To
further support these goals, Canada created the "Vuntut and Ivvavik

110.
Id.at 46.
111.
Id. at 46-47.
112.
Nymark, supra note 10, at 36.
113.
U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, Caribou Migration, at http://alaska.fws.gov/
nwrO/arctic/carcon.htmI (last modified Aug. 30, 2002).
114.
Id.
115.
Weigert, supra note 9, at 180.
116.
Stanke, supra note 5, at 915.
117.
See Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, Alaska, Coastal Plain Resource
Assessment: Report and Recommendation to the Congress of the United States and Final
Legislative Environmental Impact Statement (N.K. Clough et. al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter
LEIS].
118.
See Agreement, supra note 60.
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National Parks, in 1984 and 1993, respectively, despite evidence of
substantial oil and gas reserves in those areas." ' 9
Perhaps the group most opposed to the drilling, and certainly the
group with the most to lose, is the Gwich'in Indian tribe. 20 The name
Gwich'in means "people of the caribou."' 2 1 The Gwich'in are a small
Indian Nation who are scattered across northeastern Alaska and
northwestern Canada. 22 Approximately "7,000 Gwich'in people.., live
on or near the migratory route of the Porcupine Caribou Herd."' 123 The
Gwich'in strongly oppose any development of the 1002 area because they
fear that it could harm the caribou's traditional calving ground which
could, in turn, harm the caribou herd as a whole. 24 The Gwich'in call the
1002 area the "Vadzaih googii vi dehk'it gwanlii," or "The Sacred Place
Where Life Begins."'' 2 5 The Gwich'in consider the calving' 26ground "so
hallowed that they do not even walk upon that sacred ground."
The Gwich'in have good reason to be concerned with the plight of the
caribou-they are a subsistence tribe who rely almost exclusively on the
herd. 127 In the words of the Gwich'in themselves, they rely on the
Porcupine Caribou herd for their "clothing, tools, weapons, shelter,
medicines and nutritional needs."'' 2 8 The Gwich'in receive approximately
three-quarters of their caloric intake from caribou. 129 The caribou support
the "physical, cultural, social, economic and spiritual needs" of the
Gwich'in people. 30 The Gwich'in have been relying on the Porcupine
Caribou for generation after generation; literally thousands of years,' 31 and
by some accounts 10,000 years. 32 They see their fate as being intertwined

119.
Swift, supra note 6, at 74.
See Swift, supra note 6 (discussing the Gwich'in way of life).
120.
121.
Swift, supra note 6, at 79.
Gwich'in Steering Committee, (Dec. 2, 2003), at http://www.alaska.net/
122.
-gwichin/index.html (updated Feb. 18, 2004).
Gwich'in Steering Committee, Gwich'in Culture, at http://www.alaska.net/
123.
-gwichin/culturel.html (updated Feb. 18, 2004).
See LEIS,supra note 117.
124.
125.
Gwich'in Steering Committee, Gwich'in Background, at http://www.alaska.net/
-gwichin/background.html (updated Feb. 18, 2004).
Lathrop, supra note 16, at 181.
126.
Id.at 180.
127.
128.
Gwich'in Steering Committee, at http://www.alaska.net/-gwichin/index.html
(updated Feb. 18, 2004).
129.
Swift, supra note 6, at 72.
Gwich'in Steering Committee, at http://www.alaska.net/-gwichin/index.html
130.
(updated Feb. 18, 2004).
Gwich'in Steering Committee, at http://www.alaska.net/-gwichin/culturel.html
131.
(updated Feb. 18, 2004).
132.
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with that of the Porcupine herd. 3 3 This comes from the Gwich'in creation
story, which says that the "Gwich'in came
' 34 from the caribou," so "[wihat
befalls the caribou befalls the Gwich'in."'
The Gwich'in argue that developing the 1002 area for oil will hurt the
caribou either directly or indirectly. They are concerned because the oil
companies in Alaska allegedly carry an abysmal record regarding the
environment. 35 The Gwich'in raise the same concerns regarding the
caribou that are in the LEIS: that the development of oil fields in the 1002
area will likely drive the caribou away from their traditional calving ground
either through direct environmental damage to the coastal plain or the
caribou not wanting to calve amidst a web of pipelines, roads, oil pads and
the like. 36 If the herd is displaced from its traditional calving ground, it
could drop significantly in numbers, 137 which could hurt all of the Gwich'in
who rely on the herd for all of their cultural and physical needs.
Additionally, the Gwich'in do not want to see the 1002 area which they
regard as a sacred place physically damaged through oil spills or other
pollution. 138 It becomes clear then why the Gwich'in feel it is in their best
interest to speak with "one 39voice" and vigorously oppose any oil drilling on
the Alaskan coastal plain. 1
11. CANADIAN AND GWICH'IN LEGAL RESPONSES TO

OIL DEVELOPMENT

If Congress were to open the 1002 area for oil development, the
United States and the oil companies would likely be flooded with lawsuits
attempting to enjoin the drilling, or seeking damages. Were development
to be allowed, two of the most concerned parties would be the Canadian
government and the Gwich'in Indians. Each would most likely bring suit
against the United States or the oil companies.

133.
See Gwich'in Steering Committee, at http://www.alaska.net/-gwichin/
index.html (updated Feb. 18, 2004).
134.
Gwich'in Steering Committee, at http://www.alaska.net/-gwichin/index.html
(updated Feb. 18, 2004).
135.
Gwich'in Steering Committee, History of Wreckage, at http://www.alaska.net/
~gwichin/caribou.html (updated Feb. 18, 2004).
136.
LEIS, supra note 117, at 119.
137.
Id.

138.
See Gwich'in Steering Committee, History of Wreckage, at http://www.
alaska.net/-gwichin/caribou.html (updated Feb. 18, 2004).
139.
Gwich'in Steering Committee, at http://www.alaska.net/-gwichin/index.html
(updated Feb. 18, 2004).
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CANADIAN RESPONSES

It appears that the Canadian government is so strongly opposed to oil
drilling in the 1002 area that if Congress were to open the area, Canada
would take legal action of some sort. This could happen in one of two
ways. The first action Canada could take is one for compensation for
environmental damages that might occur within their borders as a direct
result of the oil drilling on the coastal plain. This would need to be based
on actual and identifiable physical environmental harm within Canada's
territory. 140
If environmental damage did occur within Canada's borders, the
United States would probably assert that it has a recognized right, based on
a United Nations resolution, to pursue its natural resources however it sees
fit.' 4 ' The United Nations indeed recognizes that each state has an
inalienable right to dispose of its natural resources as it wishes. 142 The
United Nations declared that "[t]he right of nations to permanent
sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources must be exercised in the
interest of their national development and of the well being of the people of
the state concerned."' 143 It is not an absolute right, however; there are
limitations. 44 It has been asserted that sovereignty over resources "is not
an absolute concept but is limited by the duty to respect the interests of
other states."'' 45 This limitation would apply "in situations where energy
46
production caused substantial harm in a neighboring state's territory.'1
This idea is embodied in the Trail Smelter arbitration, 47 which Canada
could attempt to use as legal precedent in a suit for damages.

140.
James E. Hickey, Jr., The Environmental Implications of the Discovery and
Delivery of New Energy Resources in the Canada/U.S. Context: The Environmental
Implications of the Discovery and Delivery of New Energy Resources in the Canada/U.S.
Context, 28 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 209, 211 (2002).
141.
Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), U.N.
GAOR, Supp. No. 17, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962), available at http://ods-dds(last
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NRO/193/1l/PDF/NRO19311 .pdf?OpenElement

visited Apr. 4, 2004).
142.
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Id.

Id. at 15, art. 1.

144.
Franz Xaver Perrez, The Relationship Between "Permanent Sovereignty" and
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1210 (1996).
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Id.
Hickey, supra note 140, at 211.
Trail Smelter Arbitration, U.S.-Can., 3 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1905 (1974), 35 AM. J.
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The Trail Smelter arbitration involved a hearing between the United
States and Canada in 1941. 4 The Consolidated Mining and Smelting
Company of Canada, Ltd. had been operating a factory to smelt zinc and
lead in Trail, British Columbia.149 In the mid 1920s, the smelter's output
was increased to the point that its large stacks emitted approximately
10,000 tons of sulfur per month.1 50 Just a few miles down the river from
the factory, the pollutants released by the smelter damaged some farms in
Washington State.151 The Arbitration tribunal was faced with the task of
determining whether actual damage to the farms in Washington occurred, if
that damage resulted from the pollutants from the smelter in Trail, and if
so, what damages and/or remedies should be applied. 52 The tribunal held
that there had indeed been damage to the farms in Washington, that it was a
result of the smelter's sulfur, and that Canada needed to pay the United
States on behalf of the farmers in Washington for the damages. 53 In
addition, and perhaps just as importantly, the tribunal held that the noxious
output from the Trail smelter had to be regulated continuously so as to not
cause further harm to the farms.1 1554
This was to be maintained unless and
5
until the tribunal held otherwise.
Observers have argued that the decision's most important sentence is
"'[n]o State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a
manner as to cause injury... in or to the territory of another, when the case
is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and
convincing evidence."",156 This means that "[u]nder the Trail Smelter
standard, a state is responsible for the environmental consequences of
energy production and use but only for direct, provable, substantial, and
actual injury caused in a neighboring state's territory."'' 57 The implications
from the arbitration's holding are clear. Canada could use this as precedent
to bring suit against the oil companies (via the United
States government)
58
to recover damages for direct environmental harm.

148.
Id.
149.
/d. at 692.
150.
Id. at 693.
151.
Id.
152.
Id. at 686.
153.
Arbitration, supra note 147, at 687.
154.
Id. at 717.
155.
Id.
156.
Hickey, supra note 140, at 211 (quoting Arbitration, supra note 147).
157.
Id.
158.
See Docherty, supra note 2, at II1 (stating that the Trail Smelter decision
"could offer protection for ANWR's coastal plain").
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The potential for direct environmental harm does exist. First would be
an oil spill large enough to pass into Canadian waters or reach the Canadian
shore. This is possible because the 1002 area is less than 50 miles from the
Canadian border.' 59 Hence, a large enough oil spill in the water could,
theoretically, drift to Canadian shores. This would almost certainly meet
the Trail Smelter requirements of actual and physical environmental
harm, 16 as the release of oil would be directly linked to the oil drilling, and
the harms from oil spills are well documented. For example, the world
witnessed the destruction the oil spilled from the Exxon Valdez wreaked on
6
the Alaskan coast. The chances of an oil spill are also relatively high,' '
although it is unclear what the chances are that a spill would reach
Canadian water or land.
Oil drilling on the coastal plain that in turn damages the Porcupine
Caribou herd could also satisfy the Trail Smelter requirement of
environmental harm since the herd migrates between the United States and
Canada.162 Such a definition would require a slight expansion in the
meaning of damage to the environment under the Trail Smelter Arbitration.
It has been argued that "[i]nternational environmental law should also
expand this rule's definition of harm so that it covers more than material
damage to other states.' 63 If this were to occur, damage to the caribou
would then certainly be considered environmental damage. Additionally,
the Agreement on the Conservation of the Porcupine Caribou Herd
recognizes the herd as "a unique and irreplaceable natural resource of great
value" 64 which would support Canada's argument that damage to the herd
should be considered damage to the environment.
If Canada failed in its claim under the Trail Smelter precedent for
damage to the Porcupine Caribou, it could nonetheless attempt to recover
damages for violation of the Agreement on the Conservation of the
Porcupine Caribou Herd. Agreements and treaties "represent the most
concrete obligations under international law and legally bind state parties
as soon as they enter into force."' 165 Usually if an agreement does not
enumerate remedies for a breach, the damaged party turns to customary
law, defined as "common state practice which binds all nations regardless

159.
U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, Shaded Relief Map, at http://alaska.
fws.gov/nwrO/arctic/shademap.html (last modified Aug. 30, 2002).
160.
Arbitration, supra note 147, at 684.
161.
Stanke, supra note 5, at 938. BP's spills at their Prudhoe Bay facilities are
referred to as frequent and copious. Id.
162.
Docherty, supra note 2, at I11.
163.
Id.
164.
Agreement, supra note 60, at 2.
165.
Docherty, supra note 2, at 85.

2004]

ARCTIC NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE OIL

of specific legal commitments,"'' 66 for its remedies.167 These remedies can
include a cessation of the cause of the harm, as well as reparations, which
can entail restitution, compensation, or a guarantee that it will not happen
again.168
The Porcupine Caribou agreement lists among its goals the
conservation of "the Porcupine Caribou Herd and its habitat through
international co-operation" and "to ensure opportunities for customary and
traditional uses of the Porcupine Caribou herd."' 169 There is little doubt that
opening up the 1002 area to oil development would violate this
agreement.170 For example, the agreement requires that if one of the parties
to the agreement is going to undertake "an activity ...

determined to be

likely to cause significant long-term adverse impact on the Porcupine
Caribou Herd or its habitat, the other Party will be notified and given an
opportunity to consult prior to final decision."' 7' The LEIS affirmed that it
is likely that oil development on the coastal plain will drive the herd from
their traditional calving ground, which in and of itself could be very
detrimental to the herd. 172 Oil development then falls within the
aforementioned section of the agreement. However, the United States has
not given the slightest indication that it is interested in consulting with
Canada prior to making a final decision, and has shown little to no interest
in hearing from the Canadian government on the issue of opening the
coastal plain for oil development. 73 If this trend continues and the United
States does not consult Canada prior to opening the 1002 area for
development, it would violate the agreement.
Additionally, the development of the 1002 area would, on its face,
violate the section of the agreement that requires the parties to "take
appropriate action to conserve the Porcupine Caribou Herd and its
habitat."'' 74 Since, according to the LEIS, oil development in the 1002 area
be considered
is likely to be harmful to the herd, 75 development cannot
76
1
habitat.
its
or
herd
the
conserve
to
action
appropriate
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The agreement also created an advisory board 17 7 that is "authorized to
make recommendations on matters affecting the [Porcupine Caribou herd]
and its habitat .... ,78 It does not appear that the board has made any
recommendations yet. 179 However, the board did state that if the herd were
forced out of its traditional calving ground because of drilling, the effects
could be permanently detrimental to the herd. 180 However, the agreement
does not contain a provision for damages should the agreement be
violated.'18 It only discusses the consultation and recommendation by the
board. 82 This is problematic to Canada's potential claim for two reasons.
First, even if the United States complied with the consultation requirement
and the advisory board recommended against development of the area, it
would be moot. 183 An executive agreement is only the law as long as it
does "not conflict with an act of Congress."' 184 Since the coastal plain can
only be opened up for development by an act of Congress, and because an
act of Congress opening the 1002 area would trump the Porcupine herd
agreement (due to the conflict), any recommendation against
85 development
by the board would be of negligible assistance to Canada. 1
Additionally, any recommendation by the board against oil
development has already been preempted. The Agreement states that the
parties must "provide written reasons for the rejection in whole or in part of
conservation recommendations made by the board."' 186 The United States
Secretary of the Interior "has already provided a written explanation why
' 87
he rejected all alternatives limiting oil development in the coastal plain."'
Thus the Agreement's requirement for a written explanation has been
satisfied even before the board has made a contrary recommendation. The
agreement does not require any more than this' 88 because89the Secretary's
recommendation occurred after consultation with Canada. 1
However, Canada still has one card to play if this agreement were
broken by oil development despite the agreement not enumerating damages

Id. at 6.
177.
178.
Agreement, supra note 60, at 6.
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Walker, supra note 108, at 39.
Docherty, supra note 2, at 89.
180.
181.
See id.
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States § 102 and accompanying comment b (1986)).
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Id. at 40.
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188.
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for breach: traditional/customary international law. This relates to the right
of a country to develop its natural resources as it wishes, with the
recognized limitation on harming another country. 90
In general,
"[c]ustomary international law becomes binding upon nations when they
follow 'a general and consistent practice' in determining legal rights based
upon a rule of law generally accepted within the international
community."' 9 ' The Agreement on the Conservation of the Porcupine
Caribou Herd states that the herd is a valuable natural resource, 92 and it is
the tradition of international law to negotiate regarding disputes over
shared natural resources, as the Porcupine caribou are. 193 The United States
and Canada have traditionally resolved similar disputes via negotiation,
occasionally resorting to arbitration. 194 Additionally, one observer pointed
out that based on both the Boundary Water Treaty and the "historic practice
of negotiation" between the United States and Canada, the two countries
are in fact required to negotiate regarding shared natural resources. 195
Hence the customary international law of negotiation and/or arbitration
regarding this shared natural resource, the Porcupine Caribou herd, should
be binding on the United States and Canada.
It has been pointed out that the traditional requirement to negotiate is
usually triggered only after harm has occurred. 96 In this case, however,
such an action creating liability without first determining the extent of that
liability would be irresponsible, meaning the parties should negotiate prior
to any oil development in the 1002 area. 197 In sum, Canada likely does not
have a direct remedy under the Porcupine Caribou Agreement, but should
still be able to entertain negotiations about the fate of the 1002 area, and
perhaps even arbitrate with the United States regarding its fate before any
action is taken to the contrary. At a minimum Canada should be able to
receive reparations for any environmental damage to its land, or damage to
the Porcupine Caribou herd based on the Trail Smelter arbitration
precedent.
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Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), U.N.
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GWICH'IN RESPONSES

While the Gwich'in Indians have a few a6tions they could take in
response to oil development in the 1002 area, none are certain. Even
though United States environmental law has been called "complex, messy
and disorganized,"'' 98 the Gwich'in's first option would be to sue oil
companies under United States law for environmental damage to the 1002
area and its resulting damage to99 the Porcupine Caribou herd under
traditional environmental tort law.'
The Gwich'in would sue under the theory that the oil companies, by
drilling in the 1002 area, harmed the Porcupine Caribou in some way
which, in turn, harmed the Gwich'in themselves. For example, if the
drilling were to drive the herd out of their calving ground it could cause a
decrease in the number of the caribou and, in turn, problems for the
Gwich'in in maintaining their caribou-based subsistence lifestyle. In order
to prevail on this claim, however, the Gwich'in must first demonstrate that
they have standing to sue under Article Ill of the United States
Constitution. This is often a large hurdle in environmental suits.
The seminal case on Article III standing in an environmental suit 2is
Friendsof the Earth,Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc. 00
This case reaffirmed the three parts to the standing requirement by holding
that
to satisfy Article II's standing requirements, a plaintiff
must show (1) it has suffered an 'injury in fact' that is (a)
concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable
to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is
likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury
201
will be redressed by a favorable decision.
The Court explained that the first prong, an "injury in fact," means an
injury to the plaintiff and not an injury to the environment. 202 This is
helpful for the Gwich'in because, as the Court points out, requiring a

198.
199.
200.
(2000).
201.

(1992)).
202.

Westbrook, supra note 20, at 621.
See generally id. (discussing environmental tort suits generally).
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Serv. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167
Id. at 180-81 (quoting Lujan, v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561

Id. at 18 1.
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showing of environmental damage would make it too difficult for plaintiffs
to succeed in these types of cases. 20 3 The Gwich'in then need to show that
they as a group, or individuals among them, were injured in some way.
The Court stated that simply not being able to see the animals anymore
would be sufficient, 2°4 so if the Gwich'in were having trouble subsisting
because of the oil development's affect on the caribou they would almost
certainly meet the injury in fact requirement.
An earlier case, Sierra Club v. Morton, also explained the injury in
fact requirement. 205 In order for the plaintiff to meet this requirement, he or
she must show that the injury involves a "cognizable interest ' 20 6 and that
the plaintiff himself/herself is "among the injured. 20 7 Although in Sierra
Club "[t]he Court did not define cognizable interests,,' 20 8 it did state that
"an interest need not be economic in order to be cognizable. ' ' 20 9 It has been
argued both that the Court "[i]mplicitly ... defined cognizable interest as a
private interest" and that, generally, the plaintiff makes a proper case when
he or she loses some part of the environment that, were it not for the action
of the defendant, the plaintiff had previously enjoyed. 210 Arguably the
Gwich'in will be able to meet these requirements with damage to the
Porcupine Caribou herd.
To meet the injury in fact prong, the Gwich'in would first have to
prove that there was some actual harm to the Porcupine herd. Merely
asserting that the herd was displaced from calving in the 1002 area and that
the herd was harmed as a result would be insufficient. They would need to
demonstrate that the drilling in the 1002 area caused the harm to the herd.
The Gwich'in would then have to show that they were harmed as a result of
the damage to the caribou herd. If the herd were reduced by, for example,
10,000, but the Gwich'in could not show that they were in any way
affected by this drop then they would not meet the requirements from
Friends of the Earth or Sierra Club. This is because the Gwich'in would
not be able to demonstrate that they suffered a sufficient "injury in fact,"

203.
Id.
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Id. at 183 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562-563
(1992)).
205.
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972).
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Id. at 734-735.
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Id. at 735.
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209.
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734.
210.
Westbrook, supra note 20, at 636.
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which the Court requires.2 ' If the Gwich'in could show, however, that this
drop significantly impacted their ability to kill enough caribou to meet their
subsistence needs, they will have demonstrated an injury in fact. They
have a "private interest" and will be (as a group) personally affected
because they cannot enjoy an aspect of the environment (the Porcupine
herd) as they did before, thereby meeting the Court's "injuiy in fact"
requirement.21 2 The fact that the Gwich'in rely on the Porcupine Caribou
herd for their very survival makes this argument even stronger.
Oil companies would likely contend that the Gwich'in cannot sue for
environmental damage if the only alleged damage is to animals, not the
environment (i.e. the physical, natural environment; the land, sea, air, etc).
The Gwich'in response could argue that the Porcupine herd has been
recognized by the governments of both the United States and Canada as a
natural resource, 213 and as such should be considered part of the
environment and in turn valid as the subject of an environmental damage
suit. This would not be the most difficult aspect of their claim, as the
Supreme Court has recognized that "the desire to use or observe an animal
species, even for purely aesthetic purposes, is undeniably a cognizable
interest for purposes of standing., 21 4 The Gwich'in's subsistence on the
caribou would undoubtedly meet the "use" requirement the Court laid
out. 215 Additionally, the oil company's argument would probably fail
because the Court requires harm to the plaintiff, not harm to the
environment.2 16
Practically speaking, however, this type of claim is not the best option
for the Gwich'in. Although plaintiffs in environmental damage suits can
request civil penalty judgments, declaratory or injunctive relief,2 7 the
problem in this particular situation is that if the oil drilling harmed the
Porcupine herd to the point that the Gwich'in cannot subsist on them any
longer, there is probably not much of a remedy that will be truly
appropriate for the Gwich'in. For example, an injunction could stop any
further drilling, but it seems unlikely that any damage to the herd would
quickly mend itself once the drilling is stopped. Additionally, the Gwich'in
would not be very interested in receiving a monetary payment or settlement
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because their culture is based on subsistence and hence they have no need
or desire for money.
A potentially superior, but much more tenuous, solution exists for the
Gwich'in. This would involve the Gwich'in negotiating or going to
arbitration with the United States government under the Trail Smelter
arbitration precedent. This is dependent, however, on the Gwich'in Nation
being recognized as a sovereign nation, which is not in and of itself a
completely settled matter.
The issue of Gwich'in sovereignty relates directly to ANCSA.
ANCSA was designed to quash any claims to oil rich lands that native
Alaskans may have brought. 21 8 Upon its passage the Act immediately
eliminated the Gwich'in's Venetie Reservation.2 19 However, the Gwich'in
desired to maintain their subsistence way of life and decided not to
participate in ANCSA. 220 There was a section of ANCSA which allowed
the Gwich'in to regain title to their Venetie Reservation they had initially
lost upon the passage of ANCSA. 22' As opposed to the Inupiat, for
example, who participated in ANCSA and thus received financial benefits,
the Gwich'in did not receive any land or money under ANCSA since they
opted out of the settlement.222 ANCSA formed two Gwich'in corporations,
but the Gwich'in voted to dissolve them and, in 1981, the State of Alaska
did just that.223 It was unclear after this series of events whether the
Gwich'in would be recognized as sovereign.
In the recent case of Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal
Government, the Supreme Court answered whether the Gwich'in land at
issue was Indian country or not, and in so doing helped shed some light on
the issue of Gwich'in sovereignty. 4 The Native Village of Venetie Tribal
Government attempted to tax the State of Alaska and the contractor for
building a school on the Gwich'in's land.225 Alaska did not want to pay the
tax, so it sued the tribe in federal district court to stop collection.2 6 The
district court decided that Venetie no longer existed as a dependent Indian
community since ANCSA was passed, and hence they had no power to
tax.227 This decision was reversed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.228
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The Ninth Circuit held that the land was validly set apart as Indian country,
and because the Gwich'in who lived there were under federal government
superintendence 229 the land qualified as Indian country.
230 Upon appeal,
however, the Supreme Court overruled the Ninth Circuit.
The Supreme Court defined Indian country using the federal criminal
code, explaining that this definition is often used in civil settings such as
this one. 23 18 U.S.C. § 1151 provides, and the Court quoted:
The term 'Indian country' . . . means (a) all land within the
limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of
the United States Government . . . . (b) all dependant
Indian communities within the borders of the United States
whether within the original or subsequently acquired
territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits
of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to
which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way
running through the same.232
The Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit's holding regarding the two
main factors being the appropriate test, but held that they had not been
satisfied.23 3 The problem this raises for the Gwich'in is that the Court held
the Gwich'in are not on Indian country, so they will be 234
limited if not
completely restricted in their otherwise inherent sovereignty.
The Trail Smelter Arbitration decision stands as precedent for two
governments working out environmental damage claims through
negotiation and/or arbitration.235 If the Gwich'in are not recognized as a
sovereign nation, as the Venetie decision strongly suggests, the Gwich'in
will have difficulty using the Trail Smelter decision as precedent.
However, there are still options for the tribe through other means. The
Trail Smelter decision itself does leave some maneuverability for the
Gwich'in, as well.
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One potential route to recognition of sovereignty for the Gwich'in
could be Administrative Order 186, which was passed by Alaska to
"recognize[] tribal sovereignty" and to foster "a government-to-government
[working] relationship between Alaska and tribal governments. 2 36
Although this appears to be exactly what the Gwich'in would need, it is
problematic because it would be the United States Congress, not the state
of Alaska, which would open up the 1002 area for drilling. Hence, Alaska
enumerating its plans to work with the natives on a government-togovernment basis would not be of much assistance to the Gwich'in in this
situation. Additionally, the order has been criticized as falling short of
what it proposes.237
The Gwich'in could also point out that in certain areas of
environmental regulation Congress treats Native Alaskans like states or
This means that "a tribe would have
sovereign governments. 238
Congressionally granted express jurisdiction over its territory without
The
needing jurisdiction derived from Indian country status. 239
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act,24 ° for example, "treats Alaska Native villages as states with respect to
hazardous waste cleanup."'241 However, the Venetie decision did not extend
that far, so if the Gwich'in were attempting to regulate something other
than hazardous waste on their land they probably would not be treated as a
sovereign state.242
The Trail Smelter arbitration itself, however, potentially allows the
Gwich'in living in Canada to use the decision as precedent even if the
Gwich'in in the United States are not considered a sovereign nation. The
arbitration tribunal stated that it was not deciding a claim between
individuals, but that "individuals may come within the meaning of 'parties
concerned,' in Article IV and of 'interested parties,' in Article VIII of the
Convention," meaning that the Canadian Gwich'in, as individuals and not
as a government, may qualify to use the Trail Smelter Arbitration as
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243

precedent to bring their own action for arbitration.
This would be a good
argument for the Gwich'in to make, as they could receive reparations for
any damages and potentially a cessation of the activities causing the
damage. 244 However, it should be noted that this would probably only be a
remedy to Gwich'in living in Canada. The Trail Smelter arbitration does
not stand for the individuals of one country taking that same government to
arbitration, but for two different countries going to arbitration. 245
Nevertheless, if the Gwich'in in Canada are able to use this and prevail, the
Gwich'in in the United States would reap the same benefits because the
harm to the Porcupine Caribou would be stopped.
CONCLUSION
Opening the 1002 area to oil development is such a hotly contested
political and environmental topic because there is so much riding on the
outcome for many different groups. The state of Alaska,246 BP, 247 the
25
249
Teamsters Union, 24 8 the Inupiat Indians and the Bush administration 0
are all pushing for the 1002 area to be opened to development. On the
other side of the debate are environmental groups such as Defenders of
Wildlife l the Sierra Club25 2 and the National Resources Defense
253
Council,253 the Canadian
government, 254 and the Gwich'in Indians, 255 all of
whom are against oil development.
The Canadian government has a few options if the 1002 area is
opened to drilling. First, it can recover for any environmental damage from
the drilling that occurs within Canadian borders under the Trail Smelter
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Arbitration.25 6 Damage to the Porcupine Caribou herd could be included
under this. Second, Canada can attempt to recover for the violation of
treaties with the United States.257 Specifically, oil development in the 1002
area will break the Porcupine Caribou herd agreement between Canada and
the United States which is designed to protect the herd and its habitat,258
and customary international law holds that Canada and the United States
should negotiate or arbitrate over the fate of the 1002 area prior to any
drilling because the Porcupine Caribou herd is a shared natural resource.2 59
The Gwich'in Indians also have some potential remedies to drilling.
260
First, the Gwich'in can bring a traditional tort environmental damage suit
for damage to the Porcupine Caribou herd, assuming that they can assert
proper standing under Article III of the United States Constitution.
Specifically the Gwich'in must show that they have suffered an injury in
fact.26' Second, the Gwich'in could attempt arbitration with the United
States government as a sovereign nation using the Trail Smelter arbitration
as precedent, just like Canada could do, as long as the Gwich'in are
considered a sovereign nation.262 However, it appears likely that the
Gwich'in in the United States would not be recognized as a sovereign
nation.263 The Canadian Gwich'in could bring the claim instead, which, if
successful, would potentially have the same effect on the Gwich'in in the
United States as if they had brought it themselves.2 6
In sum, there is much at stake regarding Congress's decision whether
to open the 1002 area for oil development. Proponents point at the
enormous amount of money 265 that will be gained by almost all involved if
the area is opened for development, as well as the potential for energy
independence from the Middle East 266 and the possible resulting reduction
in terrorism against the United States. However, opponents claim that
perhaps even more important things stand to be lost if the 1002 area is
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opened for oil development. The Gwich'in Nation's subsistence culture is
based on the Porcupine Caribou herd, which traditionally uses the 1002
area and coastal plain as its calving ground.267 Drilling in the 1002 area
could damage the herd by driving them away from the plain, which in turn
could, literally, threaten the Gwich'in Indian's 10,000 year old way of
life. 268 The damages that would be awarded to the Gwich'in for the loss of
their culture may well be enormous, and in fact "could be large enough to
significantly affect the net public benefit that could be derived from
opening the coastal plain" to oil development. 269 To demonstrate just how
much this could be, the "predicted net public economic benefit" of opening
the ANWR for development is $79,400,000,000.20 The Porcupine Caribou
herd is a significant and important resource in its own right, as
demonstrated by the agreement between the United States and Canada
designed to protect it. 271 The amount of the damages from breaking this
and other agreements/treaties were not factored into the estimates of the net
gain from the 1002 area. 72
Opponents to development point out that the Arctic National Wildlife
Refuge as a whole and specifically the 1002 area is not the barren
wasteland oil proponents paint it to be; it is a vibrant, beautiful area that has
been called the "American Serengeti. ,,273 Because this area is so far north,
it is more fragile and hence more susceptible to damage from drilling and
the associated construction.2 74 Opponents contend that oil development
could leave a permanent scar on the previously untrammeled landscape.27 5
Proponents to drilling counter that new drilling technology will reduce any
potential negative impact on the environment. 276
It is also worth noting that exactly how much oil there is in the 1002
area is not a settled matter. The difficulty with determining how much oil
is economically recoverable is twofold. First, it depends on the price of oil
at that time.27 7 Second, both sides have a proclivity to bump the numbers
267.
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up or down, depending on whether they are for or against drilling,
respectively.27 8
For example, pro-drilling sources claim that there are anywhere from
a low of 5.7 to a high of 16 billion barrels of oil in the 1002 area.279 More
280
reasonable estimates put the figure at approximately 7.7 billion barrels.
However, these figures do not take into account all costs associated with oil
recovery in Alaska. 281 In fact, "Alaska oil is so expensive to produce that
even the oil companies already doing business on the North Slope have
reservations about the financial wisdom of drilling in the refuge. '2 82 After
costs and price are taken into account, most estimates put the amount of
economically recoverable oil at approximately 3.2 billion barrels.283
Opponents to production are quick to point out that 3.2 billion barrels is
only approximately a six-month supply for the United States.2 8 However,
the opponents fail to mention that this oil would only last six months if it
were used alone, without any imported oil. 285 The tactics used by both
sides in the debate as to how much oil there is in the area is a microcosm of
the larger debate: both sides manipulate the facts to their side.
In making the determination as to whether opening the 1002 area for
oil development is worth the potential costs, Congress and individuals
should weigh all of the aforementioned arguments and facts. The potential
legal actions discussed in this comment are only a handful of the actions
that could be taken if the refuge were opened for development. These
lawsuits might end up costing the oil companies and perhaps the United
States government millions or even billions of dollars, thereby reducing the
net gain from the 1002 area. It is impossible to know for sure what the
environmental effects of development will be ahead of time. To that end,
this comment suggests that the total cost from all potential lawsuits, as well
as all non-legal arguments, pro and con, be examined in making the final
determination as to the fate of the 1002 area.
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